U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Announces New White-Collar Crime Policies

Justin C. Danilewitz, Sophia Sulzer
Published

The United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ("USAO") recently unveiled its White-Collar Justice Program (the "White-Collar Program").[1] The White-Collar Program's components include public-facing initiatives, including a Corporate Transparency Initiative ("CTI"), participation in the U.S. Department of Justice's Whistleblower Awards Program, and the formalizing of a Government Fraud Alliance ("GFA"), as well as internal process changes designed to encourage prosecutors to take greater initiative in vetting, generating, and developing white-collar criminal investigations. As announced on the USAO's website, "we have devised new programs to empower Assistant United States Attorneys to aggressively pursue complex investigations and significant new matters on their own initiative, all while enhancing and diversifying existing referral networks beyond traditional law enforcement sources." It further states that "[b]y fostering self-agency and autonomy for prosecutors to identify and investigate wrongdoing, the office has embraced an aggressive, nimbler model for optimizing white-collar enforcement," which aims to "energiz[e] a culture of proactive target selection." U.S. Attorney David Metcalf announced the three-pronged White-Collar Program at a recent meeting of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's Federal Criminal Law Committee, a leading organization of the federal criminal defense bar in Philadelphia. 

What You Need to Know:

  • The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (the "USAO") has announced a White-Collar Justice Program that incentivizes the public to report fraud and encourages federal prosecutors in the District to take initiative in targeting white collar crime.
  • One component, the Corporate Transparency Initiative, offers a path for companies with potential criminal liability to voluntarily self-disclose misconduct in exchange for leniency. Notably, however, the USAO has still not joined a number of other districts that incentivize individual self-disclosure of misconduct with the prospect of obtaining a non-prosecution agreement.
  • Another aspect of the program means the USAO will now participate in the Whistleblower Award Pilot Program of the U.S. Department of Justice, which encourages individuals to report misconduct in hopes of obtaining a financial reward.
  • Finally, the Government Fraud Alliance brings together both criminal and civil prosecutors and investigators to pursue parallel investigations arising from an alleged violation of the False Claims Act.
  • In these ways, the White-Collar Justice Program offers strong incentives externally and internally for private companies and individuals to report, and for prosecutors to investigate, corporate malfeasance.

 

The announcement is notable at a time when some may view the priorities of the Trump Administration as focused primarily, if not solely, on non-white-collar enforcement. Indeed, "blue collar" enforcement seems to be the priority articulated in many of the "First Day" memoranda of U.S. Attorney General Pam Bondi issued on February 5, 2025.[2] But the Metcalf announcement suggests that Philadelphia's federal prosecutors may be poised to reinvigorate white collar criminal investigations and prosecutions after a lengthy period of seeming dormancy in a district previously recognized for leading large and complex criminal and civil enforcement matters.

The Corporate Transparency Initiative

The CTI is a voluntary self-reporting mechanism for companies, referred to as "applicants," to report their own potentially criminal conduct in exchange for significant benefits. The initiative "includes external outreach to stakeholders and incentivizes companies to voluntarily self-disclose potential criminal conduct to" the USAO.

CTI carrots 

Critically, the USAO highlights as a "primary benefit" of a qualifying voluntary self-disclosure ("VSD")—i.e., one that satisfies the criteria described below—the fact that the USAO will not seek a guilty plea. In addition, as a "secondary benefit," the USAO states it will not set a penalty higher than 50 percent below the low end of the fine range of the applicable U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Indeed, in some cases, the policy states, the USAO may not seek a criminal penalty at all.

Three-part requirement for "voluntary self-disclosure" qualification 

To qualify as a VSD, the disclosure must be (1) voluntary, (2) timely, and (3) thorough. First, a voluntary disclosure is one where there is no "preexisting obligation to disclose, such as pursuant to regulation, contract, or prior resolution."[3] Presumably, a disclosure that follows the issuance of a subpoena, target letter, Civil Investigative Demand, or the execution of a search warrant, would similarly be construed as non-voluntary. A disclosure following any of these government actions would likely similarly be viewed as untimely, as explained immediately below.

Second, to satisfy the timeliness requirement, the policy requires the disclosure to "be made: (a) prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation; (b) prior to the misconduct being publicly disclosed or otherwise known to the government; and (c) within a reasonably prompt time after the company becoming aware of the misconduct, with the burden being on the company to demonstrate timeliness." 

Third, a thorough disclosure is one that "include[s] all relevant facts concerning the misconduct that are known to the company at the time of the disclosure," and is supplemented by the company as its internal investigation progresses. Assuming an applicant makes a qualifying disclosure, it then must remediate the criminal conduct, which may involve forfeiture, restitution, and/or disgorgement.

Potential aggravating factors may limit benefits 

Importantly, the qualifying VSD factors are necessary but not sufficient conditions for obtaining VSD benefits. Indeed, even if an applicant meets the three criteria outlined above, aggravating factors may prevent it from receiving full VSD benefits. Illustrative aggravating factors include (1) misconduct that "poses a grave threat to national security, public health, or the environment," (2) misconduct so pervasive as to suggest it was approved by the company, and (3) direct involvement in the misconduct by company executives. 

But not all hope is lost even for a VSD applicant with aggravating factors, as the applicant may qualify for a lower financial penalty even if it does have to plead guilty to a criminal offense. At sentencing, the USAO may also recommend a reduction of 50-75 percent off the low end of the fine range. Further, the company may be able to avoid a monitorship, assuming it has demonstrated a workable compliance program.

Similarity to Main Justice policy

Many will recognize, in the core elements of the CTI, elements reminiscent of recent DOJ "Main Justice" policies.[4] Indeed, as the CTI itself notes, "[a]lthough the Corporate Transparency Initiative relates to the Criminal Division's May 12, 2025, Memorandum entitled Focus, Fairness, and Efficiency in the Fight Against White-Collar Crime, it is independent of any procedure or protocol set forth by the Criminal Division at Main Justice."[5]

Additionally, while the CTI closely follows the Main Justice Corporate VSD Policy, the USAO has still not joined other districts that have established VSD programs for culpable individuals to report on criminal activity in hopes of obtaining non-prosecution agreements. Some of these other districts have had such programs for over a year. For example, in approximately March 2024, the U.S. Attorney's Offices for the Southern District of New York and for the Northern District of California became the first districts to adopt individual VSD programs. In March 2024, Main Justice issued guidance for USAOs on establishing VSDs.[6] And in the Fall of 2024, several U.S. Attorney's Offices launched individual-focused VSDs, including the District of New Jersey.[7]

The Whistleblower Awards Program

While the CTI enables culpable companies to self-report misconduct, the Whistleblower Program focuses on rewards available to individuals who report on the misconduct of other individuals or entities. Specifically:

Eligible misconduct may include, but is not limited to: (1) certain crimes by financial institutions; (2) foreign corruption involving misconduct; (3) domestic corruption involving misconduct; (4) healthcare fraud schemes involving private insurance plans; (5) fraud against the United States in connection with federal funds contracting or federal programs (not involving healthcare); (6) violations related to trade, tariff, and customs fraud; (7) violations related to federal immigration law; and (8) violations related to sanctions offenses, material support of terrorism, or cartels and transnational criminal organizations.

Like the CTI, the Program also provides incentives for the reporter, although like the rewards available to qui tam relators in the civil context, and to other whistleblowers in analogous programs, the incentive for would-be USAO whistleblowers is primarily financial. If the whistleblower's information leads to criminal or civil forfeiture, the whistleblower may be eligible to receive a portion of the forfeited assets. 

Once again, the USAO Whistleblower Program largely overlaps with an existing Main Justice initiative—its so-called whistleblower "pilot program," which DOJ launched in August 2024.[8] Main Justice's three-year whistleblower pilot program provides detailed guidance on the program, following the lead of the SEC's highly successful whistleblower program. 

As the USAO makes clear, its Whistleblower Program is in fact part and parcel of the Main Justice pilot program:

The United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania proudly participates in the DOJ's Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program, a critical program to uncover and prosecute corporate crime. Under this pilot program, implemented by the DOJ's Criminal Division, an individual whistleblower (not a corporation) who provides original and truthful information about corporate misconduct that results in a successful forfeiture may be eligible for a monetary award. In September 2025, our office became a principal participant in the Whistleblower Awards Program, recognizing its value in surfacing and generating credible allegations of corporate and individual crime.[9]

The DOJ and USAO whistleblower program is different from the VSD programs of various U.S. Attorneys Offices referenced above, which focus on voluntary disclosures by culpable individuals in hopes of obtaining leniency for their own misconduct.

Government Fraud Alliance

The third prong of the White-Collar Program is the GFA, which pairs civil and criminal investigation in False Claims Act ("FCA") cases. As the announcement states, "our office formally instituted the Government Fraud Alliance to formalize our 'whole of government' approach to white-collar enforcement, ensuring that our criminal and civil attorneys and investigators work closely with one another and federal agency partners to maximize fraud enforcement efforts."

Under this approach, both the USAO's Criminal and Civil Divisions will review each whistleblower complaint brought under the FCA. Collaboration between those divisions will continue throughout the FCA investigation, with the goal of maximizing the civil and criminal penalties the United States can pursue. The idea is that "[t]his coordinated approach [will] ensure[] that any allegation of fraud against the United States is thoroughly examined from all enforcement angles and is subject to the full scope of available criminal and civil sanctions."

Here too, the GFA recalls, in some respects, the similar approach of Main Justice to collaboration with partners at the U.S. Health and Human Services Department Office of Inspector General, dubbed the "False Claims Act Working Group." The FCA Working Group is an inter-agency initiative focused on information sharing to eliminate healthcare fraud in federal programs.[10] Although the GFA is not exclusively healthcare-focused, given the proximity of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to big pharma, large hospital systems and other healthcare delivery, it is safe to assume the GFA will, in practice, be largely healthcare-focused. This could represent a return of the USAO to its former glory days of large and complex prosecutions and high dollar civil settlements.

Conclusion

U.S. Attorney Metcalf's message is that "these initiatives reflect our office's commitment to engage proactively with corporations, employees, and industry stakeholders. By fostering transparency, encouraging disclosure, and strengthening partnerships, we better protect markets, safeguard taxpayer dollars, and promote accountability across the sectors that impact our communities." 

What the public should infer is clear: U.S. Attorney Metcalf and his colleagues at Sixth and Chestnut are looking to invigorate their Office by incentivizing external parties to self-disclose, and encouraging Assistant U.S. Attorneys to generate new investigations. This is likely to result in a significant uptick in criminal and civil enforcement. To assess whether the effort bears fruit, and to fulfill the commitment to transparency, it would be helpful for the USAO to publish statistics on the impact of this initiative in terms of increased self-disclosures, whistleblower tips, and the like. In the meantime, the carrots—for companies and individuals alike—are compelling. Saul Ewing's White Collar & Government Enforcement Group will continue to monitor these developments closely for the benefit of our clients.
 


[1] See U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, "White-Collar Justice Program" (Sep. 3, 2025), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/white-collar-justice-program (last visited Sep. 15, 2025).

[2] See, e.g., Memoranda titled: "Total Elimination of Cartels and Transnational Criminal Organizations," "Sanctuary Jurisdiction Directives," and "Reviving the Federal Death Penalty and Lifting the Moratorium on Federal Executions," Off. of the Att'y Gen., Select Publications, available at https://www.justice.gov/ag/select-publications (last visited Sep. 15, 2025).

[3] See U.S. Dep't of Just., "Corporate Transparency Initiative" (Sep. 3, 2025), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/corporate-transparency-initiative (last visited Sep. 15, 2025).

[4] See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Just., Just. Manual § 9-47.120 (2025) (DOJ's Criminal Division Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy).

[5] The CTI further states:

In September 2022, at the direction of Attorney General's Advisory Committee, a group of United States Attorneys working as the Corporate Criminal Enforcement Policy Working Group developed a corporate VSD policy applicable to all United States Attorney's Offices, which was subsequently approved by the Office of Deputy Attorney General. The policy – which ultimately controls USAO-EDPA's Corporate Transparency Initiative – was updated in March 2024, and can be located at https://www.justice.gov/usao/page/file/1569586/dl?inline. On May 11, 2025, the Criminal Division confirmed its continued commitment to its VSD policy by issuing a revised policy, which can be located at https://www.justice.gov/d9/2025-05/revised_corporate_enforcement_policy_-_2025.05.11_-_final_with_flowchart_0.pdf.

CTI Policy n.1.

[6] See U.S. Dep't of Just., United States Attorneys' Offices Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy, available at https://www.justice.gov/d9/pages/attachments/2023/02/23/usao_voluntary_self-disclosure_policy.pdf (last visited Sep. 15, 2025).

[7] See U.S. Dep't of Just., "District of New Jersey Whistleblower Non-Prosecution Pilot Program," available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/dnj-whistleblower (last visited Sep. 15, 2025); see also Memorandum titled "DNJ Whistleblower Non-Prosecution Pilot Program," U.S. Atty's Off. D.N.J. (Sep. 13, 2024), (last visited Sep. 15, 2025). Other districts that have adopted VSD programs for individuals include the Eastern District of New York, see https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/whistleblower-policy (last visited Sep. 15, 2025), the Southern District of Florida, see https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdfl/sdfl-whistleblower-program (last visited Sep. 15, 2025), the Eastern District of Virginia, see https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/whistleblower-non-prosecution-pilot-program (last visited Sep. 15, 2025), the District for the District of Columbia, see https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/district-columbia-whistleblower-non-prosecution-program (last visited Sep. 15, 2025), the Southern District of Texas, see https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/sdtx-whistleblower-non-prosecution-pilot-program (last visited Sep. 15, 2025), and the Northern District of Illinois, see https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/us-attorneys-office-chicago-announces-individual-self-disclosure-pilot-program (last visited Sep. 15, 2025). Although some of these districts refer to their VSD programs as "Whistleblower Program Whistleblower Non-Prosecution Pilot Programs," this is somewhat of a misnomer to the extent it incorrectly suggests the availability of a financial reward for reporting on the misconduct of others, as opposed to self-reporting the individual's own culpability in hopes of obtaining lenient treatment, such as through a non-prosecution agreement.

[8] See U.S. Dep't of Just., Criminal Division Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program, available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-division-corporate-whistleblower-awards-pilot-program (last visited Sep. 15, 2025). See also Memorandum, "Department of Justice Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program," U.S. Dep't of Just. (Aug. 1, 2024), available athttps://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1362321/dl?inline (last visited Sep. 15, 2025).

[9] See supra note 1 (footnote omitted).  See also Memorandum titled "Department of Justice Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program," U.S. Dep't of Just., available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1400041/dl?inline (revised May 12, 2025).

[10] See Press Release, DOJ-HHS False Claims Act Working Group, U.S. Dep't of Just. (July 2, 2025), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/doj-hhs-false-claims-act-working-group (last visited Sep. 15, 2025).

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