In a ruling that could impact plaintiffs' rights in a wide range of actions alleging statutory violations, the Illinois Supreme Court held on November 20, 2025 that, because the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") did not explicitly authorize consumers to sue for statutory violations, consumers must show they suffered a concrete injury to sue under the FCRA. The decision could severely limit consumers' ability to bring lawsuits in Illinois for mere statutory violations without resulting harm where, as with the FCRA, the relevant statute does not contain language explicitly authorizing consumers to bring suit.
What You Need to Know:
- A consumer filed a class action complaint against Walgreens alleging the company violated the FCRA by issuing receipts showing more than the last five digits of the card number used in the transaction.
- While lower courts found the standing requirement satisfied, the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that because the relevant provisions of the FCRA did not expressly define who could sue for violations, consumers had to satisfy the concrete injury requirement of Illinois common-law standing to bring suit for violation of the statute.
- Because the only harms the consumer alleged – such as increased risk of identity theft and breach of confidence – did not constitute actual harm, the Illinois Supreme Court found she lacked standing and remanded the case with directions to dismiss it.
- The ruling could impact Illinois consumers' ability to sue under statues with similar language if courts continue to apply common-law standing principles.
At first glance, Fausett v. Walgreens appears straightforward: Fausett purchased items at Walgreens with a debit card, and the store printed a receipt displaying more than the last five digits of her card. This was a violation of section 1681c(g)(1) of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 ("FACTA"), a part of the FCRA. Thus, under section 1681n(a) of FACTA, Walgreens was liable to Fausett for actual or statutory damages.
However, Illinois distinguishes between common-law standing and statutory standing to determine whether a plaintiff may pursue relief. Under common-law standing, a plaintiff must establish an injury-in-fact to a legally recognized interest. To establish statutory standing, a plaintiff must fulfill the express statutory conditions required for relief.
In deciding which standing requirements applied to Fausett, the Illinois Supreme Court observed that the FCRA's liability provisions did not include standing language. The Court contrasted the FCRA with statutes such as Illinois' Biometric Privacy Information Act, which expressly states that "[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation of this Act shall have a right of action," whereas the FCRA only provides a statute of limitations and language stating a person who willfully violates the act is liable to a consumer. In other words, because FACTA does not explicitly say who can sue to address FACTA violations, statutory standing principles did not apply and Fausett had to satisfy Illinois' common-law standing requirements.
Under common-law standing, an injury must be concrete, and speculative future injury will not suffice. In Fausett, the record was clear that the plaintiff did not suffer any concrete harm. She conceded a lack of awareness of any harm to her credit or identity and did not know of anyone outside of herself, the cashier, and her attorneys who might have seen the receipt. Because the violation of her statutory rights and a heightened risk of identity theft did not constitute an injury in fact, the Court found she could not maintain her suit. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's grant of class certification and directed that court to dismiss the action for lack of standing.
The result in Fausett aligns with the outcome that would have occurred had the action been litigated in federal court, where a concrete and particularized injury is required to satisfy the Article III standing requirements. As here, a mere statutory violation and alleged increased risk of future harm would be insufficient to confer standing in federal court. But the Fausett opinion emphasized that even with a federal statute, the analysis proceeds under Illinois standing law, and the Court was not adopting federal principles of standing in cases where a federal statute is involved. The Court explained that its previous rulings had expressly rejected the adoption of federal standing principles and noted that, for example, whereas standing is a jurisdictional issue in federal courts, lack of standing is an affirmative defense in Illinois.
While the Fausett ruling specifically addressed the FCRA, its impact may reverberate much further. Because many other consumer rights statutes – the FDCPA and TILA, for example – contain language similar to that of the FCRA, defendants in Illinois courts may be able to argue that a plaintiff must establish a concrete injury under the principles of common-law standing, rather than simply a statutory violation, to sustain a cause of action. If these arguments gain traction, the era of no-injury consumer class actions in Illinois could head toward an end.
